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INFERENTIAL INTERNALISM AND 
THE CAUSAL STATUS EFFECT 
Nicholas DANNE 
 
ABSTRACT: To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about 
human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential 
internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance 
Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary 
relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that 
perceiving a PR between one’s evidence E and proposition P of unknown truth value 
justifies rational belief in P to an objective degree. A recent critic of inferential 
internalism is Alan Rhoda, who questions its psychological plausibility. Rhoda argues 
that in order to see necessary relations between propositions E and P, one would need 
acquaintance with too many propositions at once, since our evidence E is often complex. 
In this paper, I criticize Rhoda’s implausibility objection as too quick. Referencing the 
causal status effect (CSE) from psychology, I argue that some of the complex features of 
evidence E contribute to our type-categorizing it as E-type, and thus we do not need to 
‘see’ all of the complex features when we see the PR between E and P. My argument 
leaves unchanged Fumerton’s justificatory role for the PR, but enhances its psychological 
plausibility. 
KEYWORDS: epistemic justification, logical probability, memory, acquaintance, 
Richard Fumerton, internalism 
 
1. Introduction 
In performing inductive inferences from given evidence, such as when attempting 
to win a card game, diagnosing an automobile malfunction, or justifying human 
memory, can some conclusions be only “probably” true? Or is that locution bad 
philosophical grammar? Supporting the ‘bad grammar’ response is Richard 
Fumerton,1 who by his theory of “inferential internalism” proposes that we can 
‘see’ by intuitive insight probable relations (PRs) between propositions of binary 
                                                        
1 Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 1995); “Epistemic Probability,” Philosophical Issues 14 (Epistemology) (2004): 
149-164, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00025.x; Knowledge, Thought, and the Case 
for Dualism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); “The Challenge of Refuting 
Skepticism,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd Edition, eds. Matthias Steup, John 
Turri, and Ernest Sosa (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2014): 120-132. 
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truth value. If I draw an ace-five unsuited at a small poker table, for example, it is 
either true or false that I will win the hand, but I may be able to see in a non-
inferential direct sense that my ace-five makes probable that the proposition 
expressing my victory is a true proposition. It is never “probably true” that I will 
win, but my awareness that the ace-five and my victory (construed as propositions) 
stand in an a priori and necessary probable relation may be more or less acute, 
intense, or salient. 
This concept of probable relations (PRs) hails from John Maynard Keynes, 
who calls them “a new logical relation” of non-frequentist logical probability, the 
latter being a set of relations about “knowledge, ignorance, and rational belief” 
irreducible to the more philosophically familiar logic of entailment, truth, and 
falsity.2 Keynes considers it rational to believe, for example, a proposition P that 
may be false, because our antecedent knowledge sets up an objective PR relation to 
P, and humans subjectively ‘see’ such PRs by Russellian acquaintance (see section 
2).3 Whereas some PR values are numerical, like 0.75, a Keynesian agent might at 
times only recognize that one PR value is greater or less than another.4 
Nevertheless, Fumerton finds PR acquaintance to justify the conclusions P of 
inductive inferences, because PRs are necessarya priori, and because acquaintance 
with them is infallible (section 2).  
My goal in this paper is to deflect a recent criticism of inferential 
internalism by Alan Rhoda.5 Rhoda finds inferential internalism psychologically 
implausible, because he thinks that it requires simultaneous acquaintance with 
more propositions than a human agent can ‘see’ at once. At my poker table, for 
example, I may need to ‘see’ more than that I am holding an ace-five and that I am 
trying to win, to be justified in believing that my hand stands in any probable 
relation to victory. To gain the PR insight in question, I may additionally need to 
‘see’ that aces rank higher than kings, that I am betting first, that I am the chip 
                                                        
2 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (USA: Rough Draft Printers, 2008/1921): 
§I.I.8, p. 8. Why Keynes endorses logical over frequentist probability in probability theory falls 
outside the scope of this paper, but see Charles R. McCann, Jr., “On the Nature of Keynesian 
Probability,” in The Philosophy of Keynes’ Economics: Probability, Uncertainty and Convention, 
eds. Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (New York: Routledge, 2003): 37-45, for an accessible 
introduction.  
3 Keynes, Treatise, §I.IV.12, pp. 52-53; §I.II.6, p. 12. 
4 Keynes, Treatise, §I.IX.4, p. 112; McCann, “Nature of Keynesian Probability,” 43-44. 
5 Alan R. Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification, Skepticism, and the Nature of 
Inference,” Journal of Philosophical Research 33 (2008): 215-234, https://doi.org/ 
10.5840/jpr_2008_2. 
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leader, etc., and as I infer my pending victory from these variables, the allegedly 
non-inferential justificatory power of the PR insight is lost.   
Against Rhoda, I maintain that the PR can be an epistemically justifying 
relation perceived by acquaintance, because some of the complex features that 
make the ace-five competitive in this poker hand (features like my betting 
position, the card rankings, etc.) are cognized automatically and unconsciously by 
the mind in type-specifying the ace-five as a keeper or as worthless. Specifically, I 
appeal to the “causal status effect” (CSE) from psychology6 to argue that such type-
categorization on complex evidence transpires subconsciously (section 3). The CSE 
indicates that humans classify the objects of their awareness more quickly or 
readily7 by those objects’ causal features than by their effectual features. In a 
scenario simpler than card-playing, for example, humans are less likely to 
categorize an animal as a goat if the human knows that the animal lacks goat genes, 
than if it merely fails to produce milk;8 genes are a causal feature of goats, whereas 
their milk production is an effectual feature.9 The point, for my purposes, is that 
because the proposition “there’s a goat in the yard” may in some (unusual) 
instances be cognized only after such complex conditioning on genes and milk, the 
perception of a PR between “there’s a goat in the yard” and “some laundry is 
chewed up” remains plausible and uncluttered, despite the many background 
beliefs that I would supposedly need in order to see the a priori necessary PR 
between those propositions. Rhoda thinks that most of our inductive inferences 
                                                        
6 The seminal paper on CSE is Woo-kyoung Ahn, “Why are Different Features Central for 
Natural Kinds and Artifacts?: The Role of Causal Status in Determining Feature Centrality,” 
Cognition 69 (1998): 135-178, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00063-8. CSE continues to 
be discussed by, e.g., Woo-kyoung Ahn, Nancy S. Kim, Mary E. Lassaline, and Martin J. Dennis, 
“Causal Status as a Determinant of Feature Centrality,” Cognitive Psychology 41 (2000): 361-416, 
https://doi.org/10.1006/cogp.2000.0741; Bob Rehder and Reid Hastie, “Causal Knowledge and 
Categories: The Effects of Causal Beliefs on Categorization, Induction, and Similarity,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 130, no. 3 (2001): 323-360, https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.130.3.323; Tania Lombrozo, “Explanation and Categorization: How ‘Why?’ informs 
‘What?’,” Cognition 110 (2009): 248-253, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.10.007; Lance J. 
Rips, Lines of Thought: Central Concepts in Cognitive Psychology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); David Danks, Unifying the Mind: Cognitive Representations as Graphical Models 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2014); Bob Rehder, “Concepts as Causal Models: 
Categorization,” in The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning, ed. Michael Waldmann (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017): 347-376.  
7 I say “or readily” because the manifestation of CSE is not restricted to categorizations performed 
under time pressure (cf. Ahn et al., “Causal Status as a Determinant”). 
8 Ahn, “Why are Different Features Central,” 143, 145. 
9 Ahn, “Why are Different Features Central,” 142. 
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follow from contingent relations too complex to see by acquaintance, but I contend 
that the causal status effect incorporates many of the background beliefs that 
Rhoda thinks the inferential internalist unjustifiably takes for granted (section 4). 
In the sections that follow, I elaborate all of these claims, not just to ward off 
Rhoda,10 but to render inferential internalism more plausible than even Fumerton 
and his other critics have rendered it. 
2. The Elements of Inferential Internalism, and Rhoda’s Critique 
As we have seen, and helping ourselves to a bit of casual language (bad grammar), 
inferential internalism is a justificatory scheme for the agent who infers from 
evidence E that her belief P is probably true.11,12 At my poker table, I infer that the 
ace-five I drew (E) can probably win me the pot (P). Fumerton supports such 
inferences13 with his “principle of inferential justification” (PIJ): to justifiably infer 
proposition P from evidentiary proposition E, “one must be (1) justified in 
believing E and (2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.”14 By 
“evidentiary propositions,” I mean propositions whose referents are ordinary 
experiences like entertaining some thought, remembering some event, seeing 
colors, etc. For as mentioned in the previous section, Fumerton supposes a 
Russellian-Keynesian intuition of “acquaintance” to supply justifications (1) and (2) 
of the PIJ. 
The genesis of Fumertonian acquaintance is Bertrand Russell’s account, 
which calls acquaintance a non-judgmental “relation” of “aware[ness]”15 between 
                                                        
10 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” sections II and IV-VI, criticizes inferential internalism for 
problems besides the contingency/necessity of PRs, but to answer all of his arguments would 
take me too far afield. The possible role of the causal status effect within inductive inference 
seems sufficiently important to address exclusively in this paper. 
11 Fumerton, “The Challenge,” 124. Note that Keynes, Treatise, §I.I.2, p. 3, insists that 
propositions are either true or false, but that I follow Fumerton in sometimes casually referring 
to ‘probably true’ propositions. 
12 For readability, I make variable E refer interchangeably to the proposition E and to the object 
of acquaintance that proposition E describes; I trust that context makes this switch obvious. 
Likewise for P, B, and any mention of a PR. I discuss acquaintance later in this section. 
13 In response to criticism from Michael Huemer, ‘‘Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential 
Justification,’’ Journal of Philosophical Research 27 (2002): 329–40, https://doi.org/ 
10.5840/jpr_2002_4, Fumerton delimits inferential internalist justification to “non-enthymematic 
and non-deductive reasoning” (“Epistemic Probability,” 160). Whether my card-playing example 
meets such criteria I ignore for the sake of argument. Rhoda argues from an example different 
from card-playing, which I take up shortly. 
14 Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 36. 
15 Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Proceedings 
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an agent and her sense data, such as a color, noise, or other person’s testimony.16 To 
this list of acquaintance referents, Keynes adds one’s own thoughts, and “facts or 
characteristics or relations of sense-data or meanings...”17 Fumerton capitalizes on 
the notion of “fact” as “a nonlinguistic complex that consists in an entity or entities 
exemplifying properties,” and he characterizes acquaintance as “a sui generis 
relation... between a self and... a fact.”18 
Thus epistemic justification via clause (1) of the PIJ proceeds 
straightforwardly. I am justified in believing that I hold the ace-five because I see 
with my eyes those characters printed on the cards. By my acquaintance with this 
fact of my experience, I secure justification for believing proposition E: “I am 
holding an ace-five.”19 The more controversial and unusual function of 
Fumertonian acquaintance is its role in disclosing the alleged fact (PIJ clause 2) 
that ‘E makes probable P.’ In the justification of human memory, for example, 
acquaintance with the probable relation (PR) between E and P blocks a vicious 
regress; for one cannot non-circularly believe proposition P—e.g., “Event x 
happened,” or “My memory works”—on the putative evidence E that “I remember 
my memory working in the past.” Inferential internalists escape this circularity by 
their acquaintance with the PR that proposition E (“I am remembering event x”) 
makes probable the claim P (“Event x happened”).20 Hence the PR is necessary a 
priori, on pain of justificatory regress;21 the PR cannot itself be inferred to obtain, 
or obtain only “probably” in the bad-grammar sense in question.22 
                                                                                                                      
of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 11 (1910-1911): 110, http://www.jstor.com/ 
stable/4543805. 
16 Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance,” 109, 115. 
17 Keynes, Treatise, §I.II.6, p. 12. 
18 Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 74. 
19 More precisely, but digressing from my thesis, Fumerton claims that noninferential 
justification for believing E amounts to the quaternary condition of (i) “ha[ving] the thought 
that” E, (ii) being “acquainted with the fact that” E, (iii) being acquainted with “the thought that” 
E, and (iv) being acquainted with “the relation of correspondence holding between the thought 
that [E] and the fact that [E]” (Metaepistemology, 75). 
20 For simplicity, I make no distinction between “remembering” and “seeming to remember,” 
although other authors might. For independent criticism of Fumerton’s concessions to the 
memory skeptic, see Josep E. Corbi, “The Principle of Inferential Justification, Scepticism, and 
Causal Beliefs,” Philosophical Issues 10 (2000): 377-385, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-
2237.2000.tb00032.x. 
21 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 219, 221; Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 199. 
22 Keynes, Treatise, §III.XXII.11-12, pp. 259-261, assumes a “limitation of independent variety” of 
causes and laws in the universe to undergird the a priori necessity (of logical probability) 
between propositions, but I doubt that the inferential internalist needs to follow Keynes in this 
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According to Rhoda, however, neither can PR acquaintance be an insight 
into all the dependencies “typically” obtaining in our inductive inferences;23 for 
those dependencies are contingent, and thus too complex to plausibly see at a 
glance. In Rhoda’s thought experiment about a car mechanic, the mechanic hears 
engine sound E  to ‘see’ by PR acquaintance that E makes probable P, P  being “that 
a piston rod needs replacing.”24 Rhoda understands the object of PR insight in this 
case to be a contingent relation, because “the sound [could] be caused by 
something else.”25 Granted, Rhoda admits that a necessary relation may well obtain 
between E and the “complex body of background beliefs” held by the mechanic, 
and P; but the mechanic cannot plausibly see that relation at a glance.26 Such 
background beliefs “B”27 include those “about the internal structure of car engines, 
beliefs about what healthy engines sound like versus what different types of 
unhealthy engines sound like, etc.,”28 and the necessary relation putatively 
representing the PR becomes ‘(E & B)→ P,’29 a relation too complex to intuit by 
acquaintance. Hence Rhoda recommends a weakening of the PIJ, taking it to 
describe the simple and contingent relations that we ‘see’ against a backdrop of 
beliefs that we already hold,30 rather than the necessary relation ‘(E & B) → P.’ He 
furthermore denies that background beliefs B, or classical skeptical problems like 
the reliability of human memory, are or need be justified by the PIJ.31 
To recapitulate, I enter this debate to bolster on empirical and theoretical 
grounds the plausibility of the claim that PRs referenced by the PIJ are a priori 
                                                                                                                      
assumption. 




27 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 222. 
28 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 221. 
29 Rhoda does not use this conjunctive AND (&) formula; he uses “(E + B) → P” (“Fumerton’s 
Principe,” 222-223), parsing the “+” symbol as “plus...” (“Fumerton’s Principle,” 221). By this 
nomenclature he implies that the “background beliefs, presumably, define a possibility space in 
which the conditional probability of the piston rod hypothesis, given the evidence, is 
significantly higher than that of any other available hypothesis at the same level of generality” 
(ibid.). I eschew the “+” notation to avoid misrepresenting it as a logical OR operator, which it is 
not. Neither Rhoda’s nor my argument suffers by my pretending the “+” relation to be a simple 
AND. My purpose in so transcribing Rhoda’s inference is to situate B in a toy PR relation easy to 
analyze, viz. simpler than a Bayesian analysis. My psychological and epistemological arguments 
are not, I assume, implicated by this simplification. 
30 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 222. 
31 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” section V. 
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necessary relations. My central argument is that the causal status effect (CSE)32 
strips the B term from Rhoda’s problematic ‘(E & B) → P’ relation, by shunting B-
beliefs into the agent’s very acquaintance with her evidentiary evidence E. That is, 
I think that being acquainted with complex evidence E sometimes requires 
background beliefs B that bear necessarily on our inferences; but if those 
background beliefs (B) operate beneath consciousness to bring the agent to 
acquaintance with E, then the agent’s insight to the PR between E and P not only 
remains simple and uncluttered (pace Rhoda), but the a priori necessity of the PR 
remains plausible, and acquaintance with it remains justificatory per the PIJ. 
Simply stated, I think that Rhoda makes too-heavy weather over the fact 
that the engine rattle E could be the sound of something besides the bad piston rod 
P. Of course it could! That possibility is why PRs often have values less than 1 
(certainty). The mechanic is infallible that the sound E necessarily makes probable 
a piston replacement P,33 but mechanics of varying backgrounds perceive the value 
of that PR as higher or lower than the next mechanic does. My answer to Rhoda’s 
worry is that what makes acquaintance with complex evidence E actually about E, 
can sometimes be previous acquaintance with background beliefs B. In particular, I 
think that the CSE employs B-beliefs to classify evidence E as E-type (see section 
3).  
Nor do I fall into circularity or justificatory regress by making acquaintance 
with E depend on prior acquaintance with B. The justifiability of human memory 
is its own problem that the inferential internalist solves if she perceives that her 
memory experiences (E) make probable that the events they depict really 
happened (P); such is the “dialectically impregnable” advantage accruing to 
inferential internalists about fundamental skeptical problems like memory.34 Thus I 
face no special justificatory problem in claiming that acquaintance with a complex 
E sometimes depends causally on subconscious memory of B.35 By the “causal 
dependence” of my acquaintance with E on my (subconscious) belief that B, I mean 
that E is a complex “fact” in the Fumertonian sense, an entity with properties (see 
five paragraphs ago); and perhaps I had to learn what “entities” or certain 
                                                        
32 Or the machinery of the mind that makes this effect happen. If CSE reduces to cognitive 
processes, so be it; I intend to beg no questions about the (im)materiality of mind. 
33 Indeed, the mechanic is infallible that the engine sound E necessarily makes probable that the 
moon is made of cheese (P); there is some probable relation between those propositions, but its 
value must be astronomically low, since no one reports perceiving it, and since anyone who 
compares the two propositions sees their relation as practically nonexistent. 
34 Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 218. 
35 For acquaintance is justificatory bedrock. My memory of B does not justify my acquaintance 
with E; my acquaintance with the fact that E is its own justification. 
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“properties” even are, before I could be acquainted with facts about them: a doctor 
becomes immediately acquainted with a patient’s neurosis, for example, while the 
patient’s kin, or even a medical student, might not. Nor need I endorse any 
particular philosophical account of how this “causality” between background 
beliefs and acquaintance works;36 the question is whether PR insights are 
phenomenologically plausible, and the overarching epistemic rule in that analysis 
is that acquaintance with PRs must be doing the justificatory work in the PIJ. My 
thesis does not, to my mind, transgress that epistemic rule.37 
Hence the remaining, relevant, twofold problem is (i) providing empirical 
and theoretical grounds for my thesis that acquaintance with a complex E depends 
causally on subconscious prior knowledge B, and (ii) assuring my philosophical 
reader that shunting B from ‘(E & B) → P’ into a causal factor for acquaintance 
with E renders the PR between E and P necessary a priori. I introduce cognitive 
psychological support for (i) in section 3, and address philosophical problem (ii) in 
section 4. 
3. On Seeing Relations Between Propositions 
Before examining how the CSE might relate B-beliefs to E-acquaintance, it pays to 
consider what Fumerton thinks the phenomenon of PR perception would be like.38 
The PR is “an internal relation holding between propositions,” he explains, and 
internal relations are those which “hold[] necessarily” if their “relata... obtain.”39 
One might argue, for example, that ‘being darker than’ is an internal relation 
that holds between the colors black and white. It is a necessary truth that if black 
and white both exist, then black is darker than white. The relation ‘darker than’ 
holds between black and white solely by virtue of the intrinsic character of the 
respective colors. ‘Being a lower note than’ is arguably an internal relation that 
holds between middle C and middle E on the piano.40 
Fumerton elaborates: 
If there are internal relations and we can be directly acquainted with the intrinsic 
                                                        
36 Although I outline what I think is an empirical correlation between B-beliefs and E-
acquaintance by appealing to the CSE throughout sections 3 and 4. 
37 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to answer the contentions in this paragraph. 
38 Fumerton notoriously but consistently doubts that he has ever perceived a PR (Richard 
Fumerton, Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1985): 185; Metaepistemology, 204, 218; “The Challenge,”128). As embarrassing 
as this point might appear, it does not undermine my thesis. 
39 Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 198. 
40 Fumerton, Metaepistemology, 198. 
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character of the relata of such relations, we might also be directly acquainted with 
the fact that the relation obtains. If propositions are the sorts of things we can 
hold directly before our minds, and if making probable is an internal relation 
holding between propositions, it might not be that hard, dialectically, to claim 
that one can hold directly before one’s mind the kind of fact that makes 
propositions of the form ‘E makes probable P’ true.41 
The metaphor of “holding before the mind” just is Fumerton’s metaphor for 
experiencing the acquaintance relation, and this metaphor facilitates Rhoda’s 
objection42 that to ‘see’ the background beliefs B that make it perspicuous that ‘E 
makes probable P’ is to simultaneously “hold before the mind” an implausibly large 
number of beliefs. Recall from section 2, however, my counter-objection to Rhoda, 
that one need not make a PR concomitantly perspicuous with the B-beliefs, if the 
B-beliefs instead subconsciously ensure that complex evidence E is about E, in a 
person’s awareness. 
Such “ensuring” amounts to B-beliefs playing a role in the agent’s 
conceptualization of E evidence as E-type: that a hospital patient’s off-topic 
remarks are apprehended not just as “some sounds” or “some words,” but as 
“neurosis.” It is this role of B-beliefs in the conceptualization of E-concepts that I 
find preliminarily indicated by the “causal status effect” (CSE) of psychology.43 
Roughly stated, the CSE is the tendency of humans to classify a given object 
under a type-concept, according to the causal features rather than the effect (or 
otherwise inert) features of that concept. A helpful summary of CSE is Bob 
Rehder’s review of Woo-kyoung Ahn, Nancy S. Kim, Mary E. Lassaline, and 
Martin J. Dennis:44 
Ahn et al. tested novel categories with features related in a causal chain (X → Y 
→ Z). For instance, undergraduates were instructed on a type of bird called 
roobans that typically eat fruit (X), have sticky feet (Y), and climb trees (Z) and 
that X → Y (“Eating fruit tends to cause roobans to have sticky feet because sugar 
in fruits is secreted through pores under their feet.”) and Y → Z and (“Sticky feet 
tend to allow roobans to build nests on trees because they can climb up the trees 
easily with sticky feet.”). Feature importance was assessed by the missing feature 
method in which participants rated on a 0-100 scale the category membership of 
test items missing one feature (one missing only X, one missing only Y, one 
missing only Z). The results... revealed that the item missing X was rated lower 
than one missing Y, which in turn was lower than the one missing Z, suggesting 
                                                        
41 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
42 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 220-221. 
43 And not uniquely so; there may be other measured effects or cognitive theories that support 
my objection to Rhoda better than CSE does. 
44 Ahn et al., “Causal Status as a Determinant.” 
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that X is more important than Y, which is more important than Z.45 
The causal status effect, then, is the tendency to rate an object’s membership in a 
given category as less likely when a causal feature (X) of the object is missing, than 
when its effect features (Z) are missing. Woo-kyoung Ahn demonstrates the effect 
not only in the assignment of novel categories like roobans, but in the classification 
of artifacts and natural kinds.46 
Thus my objection to Rhoda is that what he calls background beliefs B 
sometimes refer to the causal and effectual features by which the evidence E with 
which we are acquainted is type-categorized by our cognitive system.47 I 
hypothesize that Rhoda’s mechanic, for example, employs B to “bring to mind” 
that kind of engine noise E, such that he may intuitively ‘see’ that ‘E makes 
probable P’. That is, the particular rattle E is either metallic or pneumatic (versus 
plastic or wooden, etc.), metallicity and pneumatic-ness being causal or effectual 
features of the rattle, features about which the mechanic possesses background 
beliefs B. By the CSE, causal and effectual features present in or missing from the 
perceived rattle E impel the mechanic to categorize E as a certain type, and this 
type of evidence (like all type-categorized evidence in propositional form) stands 
in an a priori necessary PR to inferential conclusion P. This PR can be plausibly 
‘seen’ by acquaintance, therefore, because the B term in ‘(E&B) → P’ has been 
shunted out: the B term is employed via CSE to bring evidence E before the mind, 
and so contra Rhoda, the mechanic need not hold B&E simultaneously before the 
mind to ‘see’ that P is probable. 
I supported this “shunting” maneuver philosophically in section 2. There 
and here I retain the justificatory structure of the PIJ (as Fumerton construes it), 
but only elaborate from cognitive psychology what it means to be acquainted with 
complex evidence E, or to “hold E before the mind” when making inferences. Still, 
some readers may want additional reason to believe that my interpretation of CSE 
has anything to do with cognitive theory about our knowledge structures; the CSE 
may at this point appear too disconnected from epistemology. To meet this 
objection, I attempt in the next section to support my tacit assumptions (1) that we 
type-conceptualize48 the evidence with which we are acquainted, and (2) that such 
conceptualization proceeds by way of CSE or something like it.49 
                                                        
45 Rehder, “Concepts as Causal Models,” 361. 
46 Ahn, “Why are Different Features Central.” 
47 By “cognitive system” I mean mind, body, brain, or whatever unobjectionable machinery 
undergirds human knowledge and consciousness. 
48 I treat “type-conceptualize” and “type-categorize” as equivalent terms. 
49 Most of my data supporting (1) and (2) comes from psychological studies of memory about the 
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4. Type-categorizations in Human Psychology 
My task in this section is to redeem claim (1) of the previous paragraph, that when 
we wrack our memories to ascertain whether we performed an x-type action, we 
first retrieve a concept of x-type actions as a template to guide our search. To recall 
without looking at my cards whether I drew a suited ace-five of clubs, for example, 
I have to first conceptualize the generic act of ‘drawing an ace-five,’ an act which 
can be executed 16 different ways. If it can be shown that we type-conceptualize 
the objects of our acquaintance, then claim (2) of the previous paragraph can also 
be profitably investigated: that the CSE modulates conceptualization by something 
like Rhoda’s background beliefs B. Perhaps the reader will object that the action of 
drawing a hand of cards differs from the passive apprehension of the fact that I am 
holding that hand, or from passively hearing an engine noise in the example of 
Rhoda’s mechanic. My cognitive psychology data focuses on actions, so I ignore 
this discrepancy (see footnote 49).50 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
actions we undertake, and perhaps my conflating knowledge with memory is objectionable 
(Akira R. O’Connor, Chris J. A. Moulin, and Gillian Cohen, “Memory and Consciousness,” in 
Memory in the Real World, 3rd edition, eds. Gillian Cohen and Martin A. Conway (New York: 
Psychology Press, 2008): 344 ff.). For present purposes I downplay this concern, because theorists 
routinely structure conceptual knowledge and memory in a relation of correspondence: 
“[R]ecognizing an event as an instance of a category consists of matching it to a schema stored in 
memory” (Jeffrey M. Zacks and Barbara Tversky, “Event Structure in Perception and 
Conception,” Psychological Bulletin 127, no. 1 (2001): 13, https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.127.1.3). See also Johannes Engelkamp, Memory for Actions (East Sussex: Psychology Press 
Ltd., 1998): “free recall starts in the conceptual system” (136). Cf. Koen Lamberts, “Process 
Models of Categorization,” in Knowledge, Concepts, and Categories, eds. Koen Lamberts and 
David Shanks (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997): 371-373 ff. On the philosophical side, 
Fumerton applies the PIJ to overcome memory skepticism (Metaepistemology, 34-36 ff.; 
“Epistemic Probability,” 160), so my appeal to psychological data on memory seems apropos. 
50 One frustration I will be unable to shake in this paper is that while my cognitive psychological 
data focuses on actions, several key studies of the CSE do not (Ahn, “Why are Different Features 
Central”; Ahn et al., “Causal Status as a Determinant”; Rehder and Hastie, “Causal Knowledge”; 
Christian C. Luhmann, Woo-kyoungAhn, and Thomas J. Palmeri, “Theory-Based Categorization 
under Speeded Conditions,” Memory and Cognition 34, no. 5 (2006): 1102-1111, 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193256). Hence I attempt in this section to show that the CSE 
plausibly pertains to the categorization of human actions, with the overarching goal of suggesting 
that we type-conceptualize many kinds of propositions with which we are acquainted, by 
something like the CSE. 
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4.1 The Type-categorization of Action: Galambos and Rips  
Within the cognitive psychology literature, James A. Galambos and Lance J. Rips 
analyze action categorization by measuring subjective rankings of sequence and 
centrality for the episodes (“Take off hubcap,” “Unscrew the lugs,” “Put away jack”) 
comprising a routine (“Changing a flat”).51 They find that the subjective rankings of 
sequence and centrality are “not strongly correlated,”52 and that the time needed 
for subjects to categorize a given episode into a familiar routine is a statistically 
significant function of centrality, but not of “sequence nor the interaction of 
sequence and centrality...”53 Thus an important question for my paper is how 
“centrality” relates to the background beliefs B that Rhoda finds to condition our 
perception of PRs. For if centrality is a background belief B employed in 
inferences, such as, ‘that pitch of the engine noise is central to classifying it as 
type-E evidence,’ then I would have in the data of Galambos and Rips an example 
of B-beliefs transpiring before and independently of Rhoda’s alleged ‘(E&B) → P’ 
inference (see section 2). Recall that according to my thesis, cognizing B before 
‘(E&B) → P’ allows the PR between E and P alone to stand perspicuous to 
Fumertonian acquaintance. I hypothesize, then, that Galambos and Rips’s 
conclusion about the action-categorizing feature of centrality anticipates the more 
general findings of contemporary CSE research: that causal features categorize 
objects of awareness.  
Fortuitously for me, Galambos and Rips take up just such a hypothesis. They 
investigate, for example, whether the statistically significant “centrality” more 
strongly connotes either the sufficiency or the necessity of an episode’s 
membership in a routine. Because the relations of sufficiency and necessity feature 
prominently in both commonsensical and philosophical notions of causality,54 my 
assumption of the previous paragraph that centrality could stand-in for causality 
appears on-target.  
Galambos and Rips’s results, however, are mixed. In a subjective ranking 
test, they measure necessity but not sufficiency to correlate to centrality,55 but in 
timed categorization trials, they report that “[t]aken together,” sufficiency and 
                                                        
51 James A. Galambos and Lance J. Rips, “Memory for Routines,” Journal of Verbal Learning and 
Verbal Behavior 21 (1982): 265, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(82)90604-1. Each routine 
employed in the study contains twelve episodes. 
52 Galambos and Rips, “Memory for Routines,” 266. 
53 Galambos and Rips, “Memory for Routines,” 268. 
54 Ned Hall, “Philosophy of Causation: Blind Alleys Exposed; Promising Directions Highlighted,” 
Philosophy Compass 1, no. 1 (2006): 86-94, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00002.x. 
55 Galambos and Rips, “Memory for Routines,” 269-270. 
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necessity “account for 65% of the variance in reaction times...”56 Thus Galambos 
and Rips conclude that sufficiency and necessity are “not... the whole story behind 
centrality...”57 For my purposes, however, 65% seems to be enough. All I need to 
argue is that actions are categorized by type, and that this categorization proceeds 
by something like causal features, to assume that the CSE modulates action 
categorization.58 To argue, in turn, that Rhoda’s background beliefs B include these 
type-categorizing causal features is the philosopher’s job. That hurdle is, however, 
a small one, since Rhoda gives no rigorous account of which beliefs are 
background, other than that they conditionalize the belief of which an agent 
happens to be conscious. 
I propose that one way to condition the belief of which I am conscious (of 
which I have acquaintance) is to impel my consciousness of it. Galambos and Rips 
report, for example, that cognizing the most central (i.e. causal) routines of 
“Changing a flat,” such as “Raise the car,” brings to human consciousness the 
‘Change-a-flat’ action concept faster than does cognizing less central routines like 
“Put away jack.”59 Thus against Rhoda’s charge that I must “hold before awareness” 
too many beliefs to see necessary connections between propositions, I can deny 
that when I am acquainted with the ‘Change-a-flat’ action type, I am 
simultaneously acquainted with the fact that the car is raised.60 The latter belief 
instead sometimes causes my acquaintance with a ‘Change-a-flat’ action in 
progress,61 and from this complex evidence E (“someone is changing a flat”), I 
might see a PR to the conclusion that “someone is sweating.” Thus as I interpret 
Galambos and Rips, something like the CSE obtains in action categorization. In 
section 4.2, I relate these type-categorizations to knowledge structures, to 




                                                        
56 Galambos and Rips, “Memory for Routines,” 270. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Of course, only an empirical test would show that we categorize actions by the CSE. 
59 Galambos and Rips, “Memory for Routines,” 265, 268. 
60 As Fumerton warns, disputing with another the veracity of their reports about the objects of 
their acquaintance is a fool’s errand (Metaepistemology, 76). 
61 Just as a certain pitch (B) of engine rattle may bring Rhoda’s mechanic to acquaintance with 
the kind of E that makes probable P. 
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4.2 Remembering Cause-categorized Types of Actions and Events 
Although I lack data for the causal status effect with respect to categorizing actions 
like changing a tire,62 some researchers appear to suggest that our mental protocols 
are primed to exhibit such an effect in memory. To analyze this research, I must 
first sophisticate the vocabulary I have been using for human actions. I follow 
Brian J. Reiser, John B. Black, and Robert P. Abelson in distinguishing activities 
(e.g. Eating in Restaurants) from more generic actions (e.g. pay the bill),63 actions 
being routines that we execute within various kinds of activities. Reiser, Black, and 
Abelson construct this taxonomy by measuring the time required for test subjects 
to recall an autobiographical memory described by activity and action cue words. 
Subjects recall memories faster when presented with activity cues, than with 
activity and action cues, both types of presentation yielding faster recall than that 
yielded by action cues alone.64 Presenting activity cues before action cues also 
results in faster retrieval than thevice versa presentation.65 
Of interest to my thesis is Reiser, Black, and Abelson’s identification of 
“knowledge structure[s]” of the human mind, in which activity concepts reside: 
[T]he memory structure, Eating in Restaurants contains generalizations necessary 
for determining what actions to perform in restaurants... Accessing this 
knowledge structure while actually visiting restaurants results in the memory 
representations of particular restaurant experiences becoming associated with that 
structure in memory... Thus individual experiences become linked to knowledge 
structures containing generalizations used in... comprehension.66 
Helpful from this passage is the “link” between one’s “comprehension” of x-type 
activities as x-type, and a knowledge structure representing that x-type concept 
(Eating in Restaurants). This link supports claim (1) from section 3, that humans do 
cognize type-level action and activity concepts like ‘drawing an ace-five’ or 
‘replacing a piston rod.’ And given this additional support that we conceptualize 
the objects of our conscious awareness (and acquaintance) by type, we may 
consider whether these type-concepts are retrieved according to their causal 
features (background beliefs B). 
                                                        
62 I mean the CSE proper, not Galambos and Rips’s intimations of it. 
63 Brian J. Reiser, John B. Black, and Robert P. Abelson, “Knowledge Structures in the 
Organization and Retrieval of Autobiographical Memories,” Cognitive Psychology 17 (1985): 98, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(85)90005-2. 
64 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 118. 
65 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 107. 
66 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 92; the emphasis on the final sentence is 
mine. 
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Interestingly, Reiser, Black, and Abelson endorse just such a theory. They 
claim that an agent’s endeavor to locate the knowledge structure serving as the 
activity concept of a sought-after memory “is guided by reasoning mechanisms that 
utilize social knowledge about the causes... of behavior in order to predict 
circumstances likely to result in the target event.”67 For example, in the attempt to 
recall an Eating at Restaurants event that featured the outcome “didn’t get what 
you wanted,” a test subject denied remembering any such event, but in the process 
verbalized his search among what Reiser, Black, and Abelson call his “‘hectic’ 
restaurant experiences, presumably because this type of situation might result in 
not getting what was wanted.”68 Reiser, Black, and Abelson’s point is that the 
“reformulation” of the activity concept directing the subject’s search (from 
‘Eating...’ to ‘Hectic dining’) “relies on causal knowledge represented in Eating in 
Restaurants...”69 They conclude that activities, in contrast to generic actions, are 
what contain the “causal rules” employed “in comprehension and in directing [the] 
autobiographical retrieval” of individual actions and activities.70 This modulation of 
action conceptualization by causal knowledge appears to support my thesis (2) of 
section 3. 
Thus some psychological research suggests that we cognize the E and P of 
inferential internalism in terms of type-concepts, and that such conceptualization 
is directed (viz. modulated) by some of the causal beliefs that Rhoda calls B in his 
‘(E&B) → P’ necessary inference. If the function of B-beliefs terminates before 
acquaintance with a PR is had, then Keynesian-Fumertonian acquaintance with 
necessary probable relations between E and P remains plausible (contra Rhoda). In 
my view, Reiser, Black, and Abelson support my thesis that an agent need not 
perceive whatever B-belief makes a restaurant memory “hectic,” while being 
acquainted with the “hectic dining” activity concept. The B-belief instead guides 
the agent to acquaintance with a sought concept (hectic dining) from which she 
may perceive PRs to “probable” conclusions like “stood a long time in the lobby.” 
Reiser, Black, and Abelson anticipate the CSE or something like it in the 
organization of human memory, and this organization enhances the plausibility of 
inferential internalism by my arguments already rehearsed. 
4.3 Objections 
                                                        
67 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 93-94, emphasis mine. 
68 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 94. 
69 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 94. The emphasis on “causal knowledge” 
in this quote is mine. 
70 Reiser, Black, and Abelson, “Knowledge Structures,” 126. 
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From a cognitive psychological perspective, someone might object that my 
evidence is not ironclad. M. A. Conway and D. A. Bekerian, for example, report an 
inability to replicate the findings of Reiser, Black, and Abelson with respect to 
action and activity cues,71 although as Conway and Bekerian admit, the cue 
presentation times differed considerably between their experiment and Reiser, 
Black, and Abelson’s.72 Conway and Bekerian instead find a “highly significant 
effect” of priming the human test subjects in recall measurements with “personal 
cues,” particularly “lifetime periods” (e.g. sixth grade) 73 solicited from test subjects 
prior to the experiment.74 Conway and Bekerian surmise that Reiser, Black, and 
Abelson’s subjects could have been surreptitiously categorizing recalled activities 
from lifetime periods, when those subjects demonstrated faster recall times for 
activities than for actions.75 
Another objection to my thesis is that the CSE is not settled science. Rehder 
reports that “the causal status effect can be overturned when an effect is generated 
by multiple causes,”76 and can even disappear when “‘tends to’” language in the 
stipulated causal relation experiments (X tends to Y) is replaced by “‘always’” 
language (X always Ys).77 Open questions also remain about the existence of the 
effect in children.78 
For my epistemological purposes, however, I do not need perfectly 
confirmed laws of cognitive psychology to undermine Rhoda’s skepticism about 
the plausibility of perceiving necessary relations (PRs) between propositions. I did 
not even need to appeal to the CSE and its apparent predecessors as I did. I could 
have appealed instead to the “semantic congruity effect,” whereby humans judge, 
for example, the differential largeness of large animals (“elephant versus 
hippopotamus”) faster than they judge the differential largeness of small animals 
(“hamster versus gerbil...”).79 Differential largeness just is the larger-than internal 
relation, a member of the class of relations (including PRs) that Fumerton finds 
                                                        
71 M. A. Conway and D. A. Bekerian, “Organization in Autobiographical Memory,” Memory & 
Cognition 15, 2 (1987): 124, https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03197023. 
72 Conway and Bekerian, “Organization,” 127. 
73 Conway and Bekerian, “Organization,” 125. 
74 Conway and Bekerian, “Organization,” 123. 
75 Conway and Bekerian, “Organization,” 127. 
76 Rehder, “Concepts,” 363. 
77 Rehder, “Concepts,” 364. 
78 Rehder, “Concepts,” 366. See also Brett K. Hayes and Bob Rehder, “The Development of Causal 
Categorization,” Cognitive Science 36 (2012): 1102–1128. 
79 Linda B. Smith and Larissa K. Samuelson, “Perceiving and Remembering: Category Stability, 
Variability, and Development,” in Knowledge, Concepts, and Categories, 179. 
Inferential Internalism and the Causal Status Effect 
445 
humanly perceptible in principle (section 3). Why do humans subconsciously 
exhibit the semantic congruity effect? Pace Rhoda, ostensibly not because humans 
hold more beliefs consciously “before their minds” when they see hamsters than 
when they see elephants. Perhaps instead, background beliefs B1 facilitate 
acquaintance with the concept of a “large elephant,” and different beliefs B2 direct 
the search for the comparatively rarer concept, “large hamster.” The point is that 
Rhoda rejects inferential internalism, partly because he thinks that the PRs 
obtaining between complex evidence E and conclusion P are “contingent, and 
therefore not internal. Instead, they are external relations grounded in background 
beliefs by virtue of the content of those beliefs.”80 This paper challenges Rhoda’s 
claim by arguing that the CSE (or something like it) allows the PR between E and 
P to be internal and necessary a priori. The CSE subconsciously shunts the 
“content” of background beliefs B into the very formation and retrieval of the E-
concept with which the inferential internalist is acquainted. 
5. Conclusion  
My objective in this paper was to undermine Rhoda’s skepticism about the 
plausibility of perceiving Keynesian-Fumertonian probable relations (PRs) 
between propositions. Such relations can be necessary, and yet perceptible in a 
single intuition (of acquaintance), I argue, because the background beliefs B which 
make salient the PR insight—that E makes probable P—themselves factor non-
consciously in bringing complex fact E (or P) “before the mind.” That B-beliefs 
play such a nonconscious role in acquaintance with complex facts, I support by 
appeal to the causal status effect (CSE), the empirical tendency of human agents to 
categorize the entities of which they are conscious by those entities’ causal and 
effectual features. Rhoda provides no reason to doubt that B-beliefs could be such 
causal and effectual features. I additionally cited cognitive psychology literature to 
support my hypothesis that something like the CSE facilitates our memory recall 
and action recognition, enhancing the plausibility that inferential internalism 
justifies beliefs in those domains.81 
                                                        
80 Rhoda, “Fumerton’s Principle,” 232, n. 28. 
81 The author thanks Brett Sherman and Michael Stoeltzner for feedback on previous drafts. 
